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Thank you very much. Actually, it was good to hide behind my mask. Now,
I can see that I am—really this is a very emotional moment for me, thank
you, thank you very much, and let me start by saying good evening to all
of you, and I would like to start by expressing my deep, deep, gratitude to
Provost Ben Vinson, Professor Shannon French, Case Western Reserve
University leadership, the Inamori Foundation, the Inamori International
Center for Ethics and Excellence, and the donors and community partners.
I’m honored and humbled by the Inamori Ethics Prize that has been awarded
to me. I’m also a bit intimidated, I have to say, by the list of extraordinary
men and women that have preceded me. I am not extraordinary by any
means, but I hope that at least I share some of their commitment and
enthusiasm for a good cause, as well as the conviction that by working hard
with others toward a well-defined goal, we can contribute in concrete ways
to a better, more ethical world.
These contributions can take many forms and relate to achievements in
most diverse areas, such as genetics, business, the environment, philosophy,
policy, the arts, or, as in my case, justice, or, more specifically, international
criminal justice. Justice, in general, and international criminal justice in
particular, are closely related to ethics. Indeed, ethics are the very foundation of the criminal justice system. Ethics help us as a society to define what
we consider to be reprehensible conduct, what an acceptable punishment,
and what an acceptable manner to determine that such a contact may be
attributed to an individual in a concrete case. A national system of justice
is indeed based on standards and values generally shared by the society to
which it belongs and from which it derives, but what about an international
system of justice? What would the values and standards be for such a system,
and who needs to share them? At the international level, we often speak
about the international community, but it suffices to look around into our
fragmented, divided world to realize that the notion refers at best to a broad
and ill-defined group of people and governments of the world with various
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and often-opposed standards. Are any of these standards or values shared by
all, or at least a large majority of the members of such group? If yes, how do
we then identify them, give them a concrete form, and apply them in practice?
These were some of the questions we had to ask ourselves when we
embarked in the creation and setup of the International Criminal Court to
fight impunity for atrocity crimes at the global level. We had to find the way
of aligning this loosely conformed international community with a common vision. We did it through a multilateral process open to all, but led by
some. I have been part of this process that is still ongoing since its inception
until now in various capacities including as negotiator, judge, president of
the court, and now as president of the Assembly of States Parties. I would
like to use this opportunity to share with you my insider’s view on the path
we followed which could serve, I think, as a model for initiatives in other
domains as well. I will focus on how we succeeded in bringing together this
otherwise fragmented international community to pursue the global goal
of creating an international criminal court. How we managed to identify
together the values, the standards, and procedures on which to base it and
make it operational. And finally, I will share with you what we are doing
today at this very moment to keep it alive and relevant. This is a long story,
but I will focus on three main central acts of this thirty-year-long story.
The first act was about gathering support for the creation of the court and
defining the common standards. In the days that followed the creation of
the International Criminal Court, many grand phrases were set and written.
The famous phrase by the French writer Victor Hugo was often repeated.
The phrase goes, “Nothing is as powerful as an idea whose time has come.”
A good phrase for sure, but it doesn’t fully convey the difficult, hazardous
process involved in materializing an idea. As history well demonstrates, good
ideas do not flourish by themselves. On the contrary, they need to be identified as such and be promoted with vision, perseverance, and hard work. The
International Criminal Court (the ICC), was created in Rome on the 17th of
July, 1998, after some four years of intense negotiations that took place at the
UN headquarters in New York. Only hours before the dramatic adoption of
the founding treaty of the Rome Statute, many continued to think that an
agreement was not possible, that the time for such an ambitious institution
had simply not come. And yet four years before, at the time of my arrival
in New York as a young diplomat, the idea that international justice for the
gravest international crimes was crucial for sustainable peace was gaining
momentum at the United Nations.
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The end of the Cold War had altered, dramatically, the relations between
big powers, which in turn had had a huge impact on the work of the Security
Council and of the United Nations more broadly. A few months before I
arrived, the Security Council had reached an unprecedented agreement to
create an ad hoc international criminal tribunal to deal with genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes in forming Yugoslavia. A similar tribunal
would follow in 1994 to address the genocide committed in Rwanda. The
same year, the International Law Commission (the ILC) submitted to the
General Assembly at the UN a draft statute for an international criminal
court to deal with the same type of crimes on a permanent basis, wherever
committed. Most importantly, the ILC also recommended states to convene
immediately a diplomatic conference to negotiate the creation of such a court
on the basis of its draft. The draft and the recommendations were received
with great enthusiasm by many. However, despite the growing acceptance
for international justice, the proposal to convene a diplomatic conference
immediately to create an independent global court was a bridge too far for
a significant minority of states, which included the United States and all
other permanent members of the Security Council. As we all know, if you
want to kill a good idea, you create a committee to deal with it, so instead of
immediately convening a diplomatic conference, not one but two committees
were successively put in place at which the ILC draft was considered during
the four years that followed. However, protracted discussions that took place
at both committees did not kill the idea. Enthusiasm survived and actually
grew thanks to an intense campaign by states and civil society organizations
to promote the court and its expeditious establishment.
To this effect, NGOs created the coalition for the establishment of the
International Criminal Court. States founded the Like-Minded group. I was
co-founder of the latter, which comprised only a handful of state representatives at the beginning. We used to meet in small side rooms of the UN.
In one of our missions, we were very vocal about our existence and goals
but remained deliberately vague about our actual composition because we
wanted to give the impression that we were numerous, powerful, unstoppable, and indeed we were. The group grew quickly, to the point that we
stopped counting and became more demanding. We ceased to focus solely on
accelerating the creation of the court and started to develop the principles that
we considered essential for an independent, strong, and impartial institution.
States that wanted to become a member of the Like-Minded group were
now required to adhere to these principles.
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By the time of the conference, we were a big and powerful group of more
than sixty states of all regions. We had been careful to avoid the north-south
divide and had managed to engage states of all continents to ensure a crossregional approach to the matter. The NGO coalition had also grown quantitatively and qualitatively. By the time of the conference, it comprised hundreds
of organizations that promoted the court, put forward policy and technical
documents, and gave assistance to smaller delegations. The like-minded group
working in partnership with the NGO coalition was an extremely powerful
voice. It provided initiatives, strategies, and support to the leadership of the
conference. I was myself part of both, as vice president of the negotiating body
of the conference, as well as a member of the core group of states that steered
the like-minded. The four previous years of preparative discussions had been
extremely useful to address multiple political, substantive, and procedural
matters; however, most issues remained unresolved by the time the conference started. At the conference, finding common ground among hundreds
of participants from all regions required extensive and complex negotiations.
We consider that the recourse to a vote as a way of solving disputes among
delegations was not an option. We were convinced that such a global institution
could not be built on occasional majorities, but through very large agreements
on shared standards. But did we have any meaningful common standards at
all? The fact that we had managed to convene the conference to create the
court was a positive sign already, but what type of court based on what values:
Western values, African values, Asian, Latin American?
In order to narrow the differences, we also narrow the scope of our discussions to a very limited number of the most serious international crimes.
Genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and also aggression, which
found its way into the statue despite the controversies. But even with relation
to these core crimes, agreements were difficult, because only then genocide
had a broadly accepted definition. For this first time ever, we embarked in
a multilateral effort to achieve a detailed and comprehensive definition of
war crimes and crimes against humanity. The definitions were supposed to
be only a codification of pre-existing norms, but ended up including some
ambitious, innovative, and progressive elements. Most notably, the war crimes
and crimes against humanity incorporated new sexual offenses and a gender
perspective. Furthermore, the definition of war crimes did not abolish, but
significantly blurred the traditional distinction between international and
non-international armed conflicts. The definition of aggression would come
later in 2010 at the review conference held in Kampala, Uganda.
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In addition to the crimes, and many other crucial institutional features, we
also needed to determine the criminal procedures—namely, how someone
would be investigated, arrested, transferred, tried, and eventually punished
by the court. Last but not least, we needed to determine the appropriate
system for victims’ participation and reparations, something that was at the
time totally unprecedented in international criminal justice. The principles
inscribed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, such
as the presumption of innocence and the right to an adequate defense, represented standards widely recognized by the world, and constituted therefore a
very good starting point, and indeed all these fundamental principles are now
inscribed in the Rome Statute. But, in addition to general principles, some
insisted that it was the prerogative of states to prescribe in great detail how
the entire criminal process would unfold, and what would be the appropriate
penalty. While all other international courts and tribunals had been allowed
to adopt their own rules for the conduct of the proceedings, the International
Criminal Court was to apply state-made law only. The legislative effort by
states required a constant comparative effort among various legal systems of
the world. A global court could not favor one system in detriment of others.
Indeed, it had to represent all and attach to none. Again, states embarked in
a lengthy process of negotiations to agree on a workable procedural scheme.
Judge James Crawford, who chaired the work for the International Criminal Court and the International Law Commission, once described how they
have “to contend with the tendency of each duly socialized lawyer to prefer
his own criminal justice system’s values and institutions.” And I can fully
corroborate this tendency, as I was personally in charge of leading this international drafting of the criminal procedures for many years—before, during,
and after the Rome Conference. There was a permanent clash, and endless
discussions between representatives of the two major criminal law systems of
the world: the common law and the civil law system, based on arguments of
efficiency and firmness, and also a certain degree of cultural chauvinism. At
the start of the conference there were still hundreds of points of controversy
with numerous options of suboptions that had to be addressed and solved,
and they were solved, one by one, in marathon accessions of the conference.
The result was the elaboration of an innovative, unique, hybrid system
which combines elements of the common law and the civil law systems. The
product of the extensive negotiations of substantive law and procedure is now
contained in the Rome Statute and its complementary instruments adopted
two years after the conference. They reflect common standards achieved by
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consensus across regions, in discussion open to all states of the world, including
all major powers. Among them, the United States supported the creation of
the court and participated actively in the negotiation, contributing greatly
to all aspects of this framework with a large and capable delegation. While
all these standards were agreed by consensus, the Rome Statute was itself
put to a vote at the end of the conference at the request of the American
delegation. The breaking point was related to the exercise of jurisdiction by
the court over nationals of a non-state party. Seven countries voted against;
21 abstained; 120 voted in favor.
The adoption was accompanied by an explosion of applause, emotion,
and tears. In light of this final vote, some wondered whether there would
be sufficient support to ratify the treaty and set up the institution. Like four
years before, some considered, again, that the time had not come. For them,
the court would not see the light, at least not in our lifetimes. And yet, the
second act to which I now turn had already begun. Act two was about
gathering support for the setup of the court. Immediately after Rome, the
NGO Coalition of the Like-Minded reassembled forces and engaged in an
active campaign to obtain the large number of sixty ratifications required.
Exceeding all expectations, this was achieved in less than four years. The
treaty entered into force on the first of July, 2002, and the first Assembly of
State Parties was convened.
The assembly envisaged in the statute is the oversight of the legislative
body of the court. It is composed of representatives of all the states that have
ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute, currently 123. As its first session, the
assembly adopted all the instruments complementary to the Rome Statute,
including the rules of procedure and evidence, and took all necessary decisions
to set up the court. Months later, it elected the first eighteen judges and the
prosecutor, who were sworn in in the semester of 2003. Soon afterwards,
investigations started, and proceedings began. The first suspects started to
arrive in The Hague. They were tried; some of them were convicted. The
first trial of the court was against Thomas Lubanga, a Congolese rebel leader
accused of forcefully recruiting and enlisting child soldiers. As part of the
final allegations at this historic first trial, Ben Ferencz, former prosecutor at
Nuremberg, appeared before the judges to contribute to the pleadings of the
prosecution. The International Criminal Court was finally operational and
demonstrating it could deliver justice, against all odds.
The first investigations and trial were followed by others, and gradually
the court became the large institution that it is today, with its headquarters
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at The Hague in the Netherlands, a liaison office in New York, and seven
field offices in various countries in Africa and in Georgia, Asia. As of today,
the prosecutor has opened fourteen investigations, most of them in Africa,
and three in Asia: Afghanistan, Georgia, and Myanmar. The court has issued
ten convictions, four acquittals, and thirteen people wanted by the court are
currently at large.
Despite all this movement and growth, the enthusiasm of the negotiating years gradually turned into disappointment. The court was accused
of focusing too much on Africa, of not having enough cases, of being too
expensive, too inefficient. There were threats of massive withdrawals and
two states, Burundi and the Philippines, actually withdrew in 2017 and
2018. There were politically motivated attacks against the court, but also
good-faith criticism from strong supporters. By the time I joined the court
as a judge in 2010, internal and external problems were already mounting. Proceedings were slow and convoluted, and interactions between the
various organs of the court—the presidency, the judiciary, the prosecutor,
and the registry—and within each organ, were difficult. Despite constant
appeals by the Assembly of State Parties to pursue a one-court principle,
fragmentation prevailed.
The lack of cohesion was evident within the judiciary itself. Judges coming
from all regions of the world had, like negotiators before them, the tendency
to favor their respective legal system, and tended to interpret and apply the
ICC legal framework through the lens of their own. Furthermore, as judges
sit in separate chambers, the same matter result in one chamber could very
well lead to a similar discussion but different solution in another one. This did
not contribute to forge a stable, consistent, and predictable jurisprudence. The
replacement of a third of all judges every three years did not make cohesion
any easier. I was struck by a sense of déjà vu when I had my first discussions
in chambers with my fellow judges. I felt I had ventured in a time tunnel
and taken a trip back to the negotiations and procedures that were held
fifteen years ago. The ICC community was encountering similar problems
to those confronted by the international community before, and that risked
undermining the common standards forged in Rome.
External and internal observers worried, and initiatives to improve
started to emerge and be developed by various organs of the court, including
some concrete amendments proposals to the legal framework. From 2012
onwards, efforts to take stock of lessons learned and improve the work
accelerated under the supervision of the Assembly of the Parties. Upon
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my election as president of the court in 2015, I made it a top priority of
my three-year presidency to enhance the overall management of the court
and the efficiency and effectiveness of judicial proceedings. I emphasized
the importance of cohesion and collegiality. To increase cohesion of the
court, I applied some of the techniques that had succeeded to bring some
unity within the international community in the years of negotiations.
At the court, I strived to improve decision-making on joint strategies
and policy issues by strengthening or creating inter-organ platforms for
dialogue. Within the judiciary, I tried to replace fragmentation by collective thinking. For the first time, all judges engaged in a joint assessment of
methods of work, the legal framework, and their practices for each phase
of the proceedings. They did this through annual judges retreats, regular
judges meeting organized within each judicial division, and the appointment of individual judges as focal points to lead discussions on specific
issues. Gradually, all judges, as well as members of the legal support staff,
became involved in various ways in the review of proceedings with a view
to agreeing on the best practices to streamline proceedings and, if needed,
propose discrete amendments to the applicable rules.
By the time I left in March 2018, we had achieved some positive and
tangible results at the court in general, and at the court room specifically,
including a noticeable reduction of the length of trial proceedings. However,
it was clear that much more needed to be done to achieve drastic systemic
changes. Not only did this not happen, but on the contrary, some institutional
and judicial setbacks triggered, again, serious concerns. By then, patience
had run out.
In June 2019, four former presidents of the Assembly of the Parties reflected
the general sentiment in a public letter entitled “The Court Needs Fixing.”
In the letter, they noted that, I quote, “The powerful impact of the court’s
central message is too often not matched by its performance as a judicial
institution. We are disappointed by the quality of some of the judicial proceedings, frustrated by some of the results, and exasperated by the management deficiencies that prevent the court from living up to its full potential.”
According to them, it was time to make a new deal between the ICC and
the state parties. In the spirit that made them succeed in Rome, importantly,
they acknowledge that this new deal required not only the efforts of the
court to improve its own performance, but also implied at the other end
an obligation of states to, and I quote, “fully embrace the potential of the
ICC as a central institution in the fight against impunity.” States, they said,
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have to stand up for the ICC mission to be judicially independent, even, or
in particular, in situations where that may be politically inconvenient. And
states need to give the court the resources it needs to do the job.
As a first step toward this new deal, they suggested to undertake an independent assessment of the court’s functioning to provide court officials and
non-state holders with a common point of reference going forward. In the
same year the recommendation was accepted at the Assembly of the State
Parties, and the assembly launched a process of review of the entire Rome
Statute system. This is the process that is currently unfolding in what is the
third and last act in my presentation to you. This third act is about gathering
support for the review of the Rome Statute system. Indeed, following this
eloquent letter at the end of 2019, the Assembly of State Parties established
an independent expert review with the overall mandate to make concrete,
achievable, and actionable recommendations aimed at enhancing the performance, efficiency, and effectiveness of the court and the Rome Statute
system as a whole. To this effect, nine experts were appointed from various
regions of the world, who presented by the end of 2020 a detailed report
elaborated on the basis of hundreds of written submissions, interviews, and
meetings with all relevant stakeholders, including ICC former and current
elected officers and staff members, legal representatives of victims and accused
persons, NGOs, and academia.
The voluminous report contains 384 short- and long-term recommendations of various degrees of complexity. Indicated in an annex, the least of
those that in the view of the experts, should be tackled as a matter of priority.
As mandated, the experts made recommendations related to issues and the
three main clusters: governance, the judiciary, and the proceedings. I stress
the holistic and fundamental nature of many of the recommendations that
do not only relate to specific issues of structure and decision making, or the
legal and technical intricacies of the criminal proceedings. Indeed the experts
have gone further to touch upon matters that affect the soul of the system,
such as ethics at the court, as well as its culture and working environment,
conflict of interest, and conflict prevention and resolution at the court. Some
of their recommendations aimed at strengthening cohesion, including by
encouraging to go further and deeper in some of the initiatives already taken
at the court, to allow for a more collegial judicial approach and more coherence and predictability of the jurisprudence. There are also recommendations
to the Assembly of State Parties itself, including to improve the process of
nomination and selection of judges. This is in my view a hugely important
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and urgent matter. After all, the court, as any other institution, can only be
as good as the men and women that work there.
Upon reception of the report, the Assembly of State Parties established
a review mechanism to assess and implement the recommendations as
appropriate through an inclusive and transparent dialogue open to all —
the court, the assembly, civil society organizations, and all other relevant
stakeholders of the international community. This will be done in accordance with the comprehensive plan of action that details the roadmap to be
followed within a tight and ambitious timeline. Discussions have already
started this month with a view to presenting a first report to the assembly
at this December’s incoming session at The Hague. When I assumed the
position of the President of the Assembly of State Parties in February of
this year, I emphasized the crucial importance and urgency of this review.
This is an absolute top priority for the assembly and for me personally, as
I am convinced, like my four predecessors in their letter, that a profound
revision of the system is indeed required for the court to be able to deliver
on its crucial justice message.
On 17 July, 1998, the international community materialized an idea
whose time had come. Driven by a belief that accountability for the most
serious crimes was indispensable to attain sustainable peace, and the conviction that a permanent general court had a central role to play in this regard.
At the time of an erosion of the rule of law, and taking into account the
contemporary challenges to multilateral solutions, an effective court is more
important than ever. For this reason, I intend to do my utmost from my
current position to contribute to enhance its effectiveness, its credibility,
and its relevance. I thank you for your attention

